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Abstract:  
In Chiappori’s (1988) collective model of labor supply hours of work are supposed 
flexible. In many countries, however, male labor supply does not vary much. In that 
case, the husband’s labor supply is no longer informative about the household 
decision process and individual preferences. To identify structural components of the 
model, additional information is needed. We thus consider an approach in which the 
wife’s labor supply is expressed as a function of the household demand for one 
specific good. We demonstrate that the main properties of Chiappori’s initial model 
are preserved and apply our results on French data. 
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1 Introduction
The collective model of labor supply, developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992), is by
now a standard tool for analyzing household decisions. This model is based on
two fundamental hypotheses  each household member is characterized by specic
preferences, and decisions result in Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes  which turn out to be
su¢ cient to generate strong testable restrictions on spouseslabor supply. Moreover,
if consumption is purely private and agents are egoistic, the characteristics of the
structural model, such as individual preferences and the rule that determines the
distribution of welfare within the household, can be identied from the observation
of spouseslabor supply.1
These features of the collective model have turned out to be very attractive, and
the number of empirical studies based on Chiapporis initial framework is consid-
erable. These include Bloemen (2004, Netherlands), Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix
(2002, United States), Clark, Couprie and Sofer (2004, United Kingdom), Fortin and
Lacroix (1997, Canada), Moreau and Donni (2002, France) and Vermeulen (2005,
Belgium). However, the large majority of these investigations does not account for
the fact that, in most developed countries, male labor supply is rigid and largely
determined by exogenous constraints. If the dispersion in husbandshours is very
limited and/or does not stem from spouses optimal decisions, the identication
results given in Chiapporis papers may well be inappropriate.
One important exception in the empirical studies devoted to collective models
is given by Blundell et alii (2004). These authors emphasize that in the United
Kingdom (but this certainly holds true in other countries), if men work, they work
nearly always full-time; the wifes working hours, on the contrary, are largely dis-
persed. The theoretical model they develop then allows for these essential features:
the wifes labor supply is assumed to be continuous, whereas the husbands choices
are assumed to be discrete (either full-time working or non-working). These authors
show that the main conclusions which were derived by Chiappori in the initial con-
text are still valid here. One drawback, however, is that the result of identiability
and testability given by Blundell et alii (2004) holds only if the husbands choice
1The collective model of labor supply has recently been extended in various directions. Chiap-
pori, Blundell and Meghir (2004) allow for the existence of both private and public consumption.
Donni (2003) incorporates the possibility of non-participatory decisions and non-linear taxation.
Apps and Rees (1997), Chiappori (1997) and Donni (2005a) recognize the role of domestic pro-
duction and allow for the fact that a proportion of non-market time is spent producing goods and
services within the household. Fong and Zhang (2001) study a collective model of labor supply
where there are two distinct types of leisure : one type is each persons independent (or private)
leisure, and the other type is spousal (or public) leisure. See Vermeulen (2002) and Donni (2005b)
for a survey of collective models.
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between full-time working and non-working is free; in particular, it could be seri-
ously misleading if unemployment is mistakenly interpreted as the decision of not
participating in the labor market.
In the present paper we deal with the rigidity of the husbands behavior in the
French labor market. The approach is quite di¤erent from Blundell et aliis (2004),
though. The starting observation is that the variability in the husbands working
hours is very limited. In addition, since the behavior of the few husbands who
do not work can probably be explained by exogenous constraints (e.g., involuntary
unemployment), the employment status of the husband can hardly give reliable
information about individual preferences and the decision process. The strategy
adopted in what follows is then to exploit the information in household consump-
tion to derive testable restrictions and identify the intra-household distribution of
welfare.2 More precisely, we propose a very simple approach to model wiveslabor
supply, in which the wifes behavior is explained by her wage rate, other household
incomes, socio-demographic variables and the demand for one good consumed at
the household level. In that case, as is explained in what follows, the level of the
conditioning good summarizes the most important characteristics of the decision
process. We then demonstrate that the estimation of this single-equation permits
to carry out tests of collective rationality and identify some elements of the struc-
tural model. In addition we also show that the present framework is compatible
with home production if the production function belongs to some specic family of
separable technologies.
This framework is advantageous at three levels. Firstly, the theoretical results
do not postulate a particular explanation for the rigidity of the husbands behav-
ior. Contrary to Blundell et alii (2004), identication does not exploit the quite
limited variations in husbandsworking hours, which may well stem from demand
side constraints. Secondly, the econometric techniques developed for the estimation
of single-equation models can be used to estimate the wifes labor supply, since the
determination of the demand for the conditioning good needs not to be explicitly
modelled. Thirdly, the variables which a¤ect the distribution of power within the
household need not to be exactly observed. They are summarized by the level of
the conditioning good. This point is explained in the remainder of the paper.
These theoretical results are followed by an empirical application using French
data for those couples in which the wife participates in the labor market and the
husband works full-time. The conditioning good is the household expenditures on
food at home. The wifes labor supply is then estimated by GMM, taking into
2The strategy is thus analogous in some respects to that in Donni (2005c), who estimates a
system of household demands together with one labor supply.
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account the selection bias (which results from the selection of the sample). The
restrictions which are derived from Pareto e¢ ciency are tested and not rejected by
the data.
The paper is structured as follows. The theoretical model is developed in Section
2 and a very general functional form is presented in Section 3. The data and the
empirical results are described in Section 4. All the proofs are collected in Appendix
A.
2 Theory
2.1 Basic framework
Preferences and budget set. We consider only the case of a two-person house-
hold, consisting of a wife (f) and a husband (m), who make decisions about leisure
and consumption.3 The market labor supply of spouse i (i = m; f) is denoted by hi,
with market wage rate wi. The private consumption can be broken down into two
aggregate goods, which are denoted by ci and xi, so that each household member
is characterized by specic preferences over (hi; ci; xi). These can be represented by
utility functions of the form:
ui(T   hi; ci; xi; z); (1)
where T is total time endowment and z is a vector of socio-demographic factors,4
that are both strongly concave, innitely di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in
(T   hi), ci and xi. The household members are said to be egoisticin the sense
that their utility only depends on their own consumption and leisure. This may seem
restrictive but, as shown in Chiappori (1992), all the results immediately extend to
the case of altruisticagents in a Beckerian sense with utilities represented by the
form:
Wi[um(T   hm; cm; xm; z); uf (T   hf ; cf ; xf ; z)],
where Wi() is a strictly increasing function. The crucial hypothesis is the existence
of some type of separability in the spousespreferences.
At this stage, we suppose that there is no domestic production.5 Let y be the
household non-labor income. The budget set is then written as:
y + hmwm + hfwf > c+ x (2)
3The couple is not necessarily married. The terminology is chosen for convenience.
4For convenience we suppose that the same socio-demographic factors z enter both utility
functions.
5This assumption is relaxed in Section 2.5. We shall show that our theoretical results continue
to hold with domestic production for a general class of production technologies.
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and
0 6 hi 6 T; ci > 0; xi > 0. (3)
where c = cm + cf and x = xm + xf . We may note that, in consumer expenditure
surveys, consumption is usually recorded at the household level. We thus assume in
what follows that the econometrician observes hi, c and x, but does not observe ci
and xi.
In France  and in many other countries for that matter  the distribution of
the number of mens working hours is very concentrated around the full-time bound.
Consequently, as a convenient approximation at least, we assume the husbands labor
supply is constant, i.e.,
hm = h
; (4)
where 0 < h 6 T . The reason for this rigidity is beyond the scope of this paper. It
may result from the husbands preferences, demand-side constraints or institutional
rigidities. Quite importantly, however, our theoretical results are general in the
sense that they do not rely on a specic explanation of the husbands behavior.
Pareto e¢ ciency and optimization. The main originality of the e¢ ciency ap-
proach is the fact that the household decisions result in Pareto-e¢ cient outcomes
and that no additional assumption is made about the process. That means, for any
wage-income bundle, the labor-consumption bundle chosen by the household is such
that no other bundle in the budget set could leave both members better o¤. This
assumption, even if not formally justied, has a good deal of intuitive appeal. First
of all, the household is one of the preeminent examples of a repeated game. Then,
given the symmetry of information, it is plausible that agents nd mechanisms to
support e¢ cient outcomes since cooperation often emerges as a long-term equilib-
rium of repeated noncooperative relations. A second point is that axiomatic models
of bargaining with symmetric information, such as Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky bar-
gaining, which have been previously used to analyze negotiation within the house-
hold (Manser and Brown, 1980, and McElroy and Horney, 1981), assume e¢ cient
outcomes.
Taking account of the restriction on the husbands working hours, Pareto-e¢ ciency
essentially means that a scalar  exists so that the household behavior is a solution
to the following program:
max
fhi;ci;xiji=m;fg
(1  )  uf (T   hf ; cf ; xf ; z) +   um(T   hm; cm; xm; z) (5)
with respect to (2)(4). The parameter  has an obvious interpretation as a distrib-
ution of powerindex. If  = 0, the household behaves as though the wife always got
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her way, whereas, if  = 1; it behaves as if the husband was the e¤ective dictator.
To obtain well-behaved labor supplies and demands, however, we assume that  is a
single-valued and innitely di¤erentiable function of wf , wm, y and z, with a range
comprised between 0 and 1. This is standard in the literature on collective models.
2.2 Decentralization and functional structure
Let us dene  = y + hwm as the nonwifeincome. As is well-known (Chiappori,
1992), if agents are egoistic and consumption is purely private, Pareto e¢ ciency
implies that the household decision process can be decentralized. More precisely, if
(hm; hf ; cm; cf ; xm; xf ) are solutions to Program (5), a sharing (;    ) of nonwife
income exists so that the husbands and the wifes behaviors can be described by
the following programs:
A. Husbands Program:
max
cm;xm
um(T   h; cm; xm; z) subject to cm + xm 6 ,
cm > 0 and xm > 0;
B. Wifes Program:
max
hf ;cf ;xf
uf (T   hf ; cf ; xf ; z) subject to cf + xf =    + hfwf ,
0 6 hf 6 T , cf > 0 and xf > 0:
In general, the sharing of  will depend on wf , wm, y and z. Hence, without loss of
generality, we write the husbands share as:  = (wf ;  ; s; z), where s = y= is the
ratio of nonlabor income and nonwife income. In standard terminology the variable
s is called a distribution factor. In what follows, the husbands share ; expressed
as a function of (wf ;  ; s; z); is referred to as the sharing rule.
The result above determines the functional structure that characterizes the wifes
labor supply and the households demand for goods. Let us denote the solutions to
the wifes and husbands optimization programs (in terms of what is observable) by
c(wf ;  ; s; z), x(wf ;  ; s; z) and hf (wf ;  ; s; z). Then we have:
x(wf ;  ; s; z) = m((wf ;  ; s; z); z) + f (wf ;    (wf ;  ; s; z); z), (6)
where m and f are the husbands and wifes Marshallian demand for good x
respectively, and
hf (wf ;  ; s; z) = f (wf ;    (wf ;  ; s; z); z), (7)
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where f is the wifes Marshallian labor supply. In particular, this relation satises
Slutsky Positivity :
@f
@wf
  @f
@(   )  hf > 0 (8)
for an interior solution. Note that the husbands wage rate inuences the husbands
behavior only through the individual shares of nonwife income. In particular the
function m is independent of wm (conditionally on ). This property is a direct
consequence of the husbands labor supply rigidity.
2.3 The s-conditional approach
In the present section we dene a specic concept of conditional labor supply
whereby the labor supply is expressed as a function of various variables and the
level of good x. Note that conditional demands or supplies are often used in tradi-
tional analysis where a single utility function is assumed.6 However, the conditional
function concerned here is somewhat di¤erent.
First, let us assume that:
@x
@s
6= 0 (9)
in an open subset of the domain of x(wf ;  ; s; z), i.e., the source of nonwife in-
come (locally) inuences the demand for good x. Then, from the implicit function
theorem, the demand for good x can be inverted on s to yield s = s(wf ;  ; x; z).
Let us incorporate this into the wifes share of income and obtain what we call the
s-conditionalsharing rule, denoted by
(wf ;  ; x; z) = (wf ;  ; s(wf ;  ; x; z); z):
The s-conditional sharing rule has a specic property that is described in the fol-
lowing lemma.
Lemma 1 The s-conditional sharing rule is implicitly dened as the solution of:
x = m((wf ;  ; x; z); z) + f (wf ;    (wf ;  ; x; z); z).
The proof is straightforward: for any , the equation of demand for good x
must be identically satised. This implies that the s-conditional sharing rule has a
property of separability.
6See for instance Pollak (1969), Chavas (1984), Browning and Meghir (1991) or Browning (1998).
These authors dene di¤erent concepts of conditional demands in the traditional framework.
8
Now let us assume that there are no corner solutions. In particular the wife
participates in the labor market. We then introduce the s-conditional sharing rule
into the wifes labor supply and obtain:
hf (wf ;  ; x; z) = f (wf ;    (wf ;  ; x; z); z); (10)
where (wf ;  ; x; z) has the property given in Lemma 1. We shall refer to this
concept as the s-conditional labor supply.7 Note that in (10) the information
concerning the source of nonwife income, represented by s, is completely summarized
by the level of the conditioning good x.
There are two distinct advantages to modelling an s-conditional labor supply
instead of a direct one. Indeed, in modelling an s-conditional labor supply, there is
no need:
(i) to model the determination of the conditioning good explicitly.
The s-conditional approach does not require an explicit structural model for
the conditioning good at all. In contrast to usual collective models of labor
supply à la Chiappori (1988, 1992), the s-conditional labor supply can be esti-
mated with single-equation techniques.8 This is useful because the estimation
of labor supply models is generally very expensive in computer-time.
(ii) to observe the distribution of nonwife income between its sources.
This is particularly compelling since, in empirical work, such information is
often unreliable. More generally, the e¤ect of any distribution factor, even
unobserved or unknown for the econometrician, is incorporated in the condi-
tioning good.
Nevertheless, the attractiveness of the s-conditional approach largely depends
on the properties of s-conditional labor supplies, namely, whether the underlying
assumptions are testable and the structural model identiable from the observation
of one s-conditional labor supply. These important questions are examined in the
next section.
7This concept is not completely original, though. Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995)
examine this form of conditional functions in the context of demand analysis with constant prices.
Donni (2004) considers the case of variable prices. However, these authors suppose that the
conditioning good is consumed by only one person in the household, which makes things much
simpler.
8This is also an advantage over the approach used in Donni (2005c), which is very cumbersome.
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2.4 Properties of s-conditional labor supplies
In order to investigate the testability and identiability issues we assume that the
wifes s-conditional labor supply exists over an open subset S. We now introduce
some pieces of notation:
(wf ;  ; x; z) =  @hf
@ 

@hf
@x
 1
;
(wf ;  ; x; z) =
@hf
@x

@
@ 
@hf
@x
  @
@x
@hf
@ 
 1
.
In the discussion of Proposition 2 below, we shall show that (wf ;  ; x; z) represents
the slope of the husbands Marshallian demand for good x, whereas (wf ;  ; x; z)
corresponds to the inverse of the derivative of this slope.
Let us assume now that the wifes s-conditional labor supply satises some reg-
ularity conditions.
Assumption R The wifes s-conditional labor supply is such that
@hf
@x
6= 0, @
@x
6= 0 and @
@ 
@hf
@x
6= @
@x
@hf
@ 
;
for any (wf ;  ; x; z) 2 S.
Note that, if the wife does not participate in the labor market, these conditions
do not hold, and the conclusions that follow are not valid.
The next result states that the s-conditional sharing rule can be retrieved from
the sole observation of the wifes s-conditional labor supply.
Proposition 2 Let us assume that the wifes s-conditional labor supply hf (wf ;  ;
x; z) satises R. Then,
(a) the s-conditional sharing rule can be retrieved on S up to a function k(z) of
z; specically, its derivatives are given by
@
@wf
=
@
@wf
,
@
@x
=
@
@x
,
@
@ 
=
@
@ 
;
(b) for each choice of k(z), the wifes marginal rate of substitution between total
consumption (c + x) and leisure (T   h), i.e., the preferences between total
consumption and leisure, is uniquely dened;
10
(c) the wifes Marshallian labor supply and the individual Marshallian demands
can be retrieved up to a function of z.
The complete proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A. We briey give the
rst step of the argument here. By denition, the slope of the husbands Marshallian
demand for good x is given by the increase in x due to a one-unity variation in ,
keeping    , wf and z constant. Note now that hf depends only on    , wf
and z. Then, a one-unity variation in  ; so that hf , wf and z remain una¤ected,
provides the slope of the husbands Marshallian demand. Consequently, if we apply
the implicit function theorem to hf (wf ; x;  ; z) such that x is di¤erentiated with
respect to  , we obtain the slope of the husbands Marshallian demand:
@m
@
=  @hf=@ 
@hf=@x
= . (11)
Note that @m=@ (and thus ) depends only on  and z. The identication of
the s-conditional sharing rule then follows from the di¤erentiation of (11) and the
resolution of the system of partial di¤erential equations that results.
The s-conditional approach has two main drawbacks as far as identication issues
are concerned. Firstly, even if the s-conditional sharing rule can be recovered (up
to a function of z), its theoretical interpretation is unclear. The reason is that
the s-conditional sharing rule is expressed as a function of the level of good x,
which is endogenously determined. Secondly, the s-conditional sharing rule and the
other structural elements can be retrieved as long as the wife participates in the
labor market but the identication cannot be extended beyond the participation
set. However, these drawbacks are simply a converse of the fact that we need less
information to estimate an s-conditional labor supply than a system of unconditional
labor supply and demand of goods, as in Donni (2005c). In particular there is neither
a need to observe the level of the demand for good x when the wife does not work,
nor one to observe the sources of nonwife income.
We show in the next proposition that the wifes s-conditional labor supply has
to satisfy some constraints to be consistent with collective rationality.
Proposition 3 Let us assume that the wifes s-conditional labor supply hf (wf ;
 ; x; z) satises R. Then, for any (wf ;  ; x; z) 2 S,
(a)
@hf
@wf
  @hf
@x

@=@wf
@=@x
  hf
 (@=@x)

> 0;
(b)
@
@wf
@
@x
  @
@x
@
@wf
=
@
@ 
@
@x
  @
@x
@
@ 
= 0.
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These restrictions provide a joint test of collective rationality under specic as-
sumptions, i.e., consumption is purely private, there is no domestic production and
agents are egoistic (or caring). The inequality (a) results from condition (8) trans-
posed into the s-conditional context. The system of partial di¤erential equations
(b) is due to the separability property that characterizes (6) and (7). The proof of
that is provided in Appendix A.
We now suppose that leisure and goods are superior (i.e., normal). In many
circumstances this assumption is uncontroversial because goods are very aggregated.
If so, the s-conditional approach implies several additional restrictions which are
presented in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 Let us assume that the wifes s-conditional labor supply hf (wf ;
 ; x; z) satises R. Then, for any (wf ;  ; x; z) 2 S,
(a) if leisure is superior,
@hf=@x
 (@=@x)
> 0;
(b) if goods x and c are superior (for both spouses),
min

1; 1 +
1 + wf (@hf=@x)
 (@=@x)

>  > max

0;
1
 (@=@x)

.
This result, which is a straightforward consequence of Proposition 2, provides
a new test of collective rationality under the additional assumption of consump-
tion superiority. In particular the second statement of Proposition 4 deserves some
comments. If one inequality in this statement is violated by , then (at least) one
slope of the four Engel curves must be negative. To illustrate that, let us remember
that  coincides with the slope of the husbands Engel curve for good x. Then, if
 < 0, good x is inferior for the husband (but good c is necessarily superior from
the Engels aggregation condition). On the contrary, if  > 1, good x is superior
and good c is inferior. The interpretation of the other inequalities, which are related
to the wifes behavior, are more complicated, though. The reader is referred to the
proof in Appendix A.
2.5 Another interpretation: the role of domestic production
Undoubtedly, the absence of domestic production is a serious shortcoming of the
model developed above. Hence, in this subsection, we incorporate the fact that a
proportion of time not allocated to market labor supply may be spent producing
12
goods within the household. To do so, we suppose that h1i = hi + h
2
i , where h
1
i and
h2i respectively is spouse is total labor supply and domestic labor supply.
9 That
means, non-market time can be broken down into time consumed in leisure, T  h1i ,
and time spent in domestic production, h2i . Then we suppose that goods can be
produced using individualtechnologies of the form:
h2i = fi(c
2
i ; x
2
i ) (12)
where fi is a function, increasing and strictly convex in its arguments, and c2i et x
2
i
denote the proportion of goods c and x entering spouse is production process, where
as usual a positive number indicates an output and a negative number indicates an
input. Note that goods c and x are marketable in the sense that they can either
be purchased (or sold) in the market or produced at home.10 Also, the prices are
exogenously xed by the market.
In the specication of the production technology, the fact that fi does not depend
on h2j (j 6= i) is crucial in the development that follows. That implies there is
neither substitutability nor complementarity in spousestime inputs. Overall, this
assumption seems to be supported (as a valid approximation at least) by the rare
empirical studies of domestic activities (e.g., Graham and Greene, 1984). Now let
us suppose that spousesutility is a function of leisure (instead of nonmarket time)
and consumption. We have:
vi(T   h1i ; c1i ; x1i ); (13)
where c1i and x
1
i denote the proportion of c and x which is directlyconsumed by
spouse i (which includes the outputs of the production process and excludes the
inputs). We have: c1i = ci+ c
2
i and x
1
i = xi+x
2
i , where ci and xi denote the quantity
of goods purchased in the market for spouse is use.
The basic idea of the reasoning is that if the production technology is of the
form (12), the utility function (1) which is used in the preceding subsections can be
derived from a more fundamental representation of preferences, described by (13).
We have:
ui(hi; ci; xi) = max
c1i ;x
1
i ;c
2
i ;x
2
i
vi(T   hi   fi(c2i ; x2i ); c1i ; x1i ); (14)
subject to
c1i   c2i = ci; x1i   x2i = xi:
9To simplify the presentation of this subsection and emphasize the intuition, we do not take into
account the rigidity of the husbands labor supply and we do not specify the various non-negativity
restrictions on domestic labor supplies and consumptions.
10For example, meals can be produced within the household or bought from a caterer. Gronau
(1977) gives a justication of this traditional assumption.
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Since the price of goods is constant (and equal to one), this result is a straightforward
application of the Hicksaggregation theorem. The intuition goes as follows. The
allocation process can now be represented in three stages. Firstly, spouses agree
on a sharing of nonwife income as previously. Secondly, each spouse maximizes ui
with respect to hi, ci and xi; taking account of the wifes share of nonwife income.
Thirdly, each spouse maximizes vi with respect to c1i , x
1
i , c
2
i and x
2
i ; taking account
of their individual production technology and their preceding choices of hi, ci and
xi. This last stage, which characterizes the domestic production interpretation, is
described by Program (14) above. Note that the arbitrage between domestic and
market activities is determined by the comparison of market wage rate and domestic
productivity. If productivity is high, it is protable to devote a large proportion of
time to domestic activities. This may explain the specialization of one spouse in
market or domestic activities.
Now, if the interpretation above is accepted, the individual demands that are
retrievable from Proposition 2 can be seen as the di¤erence of the demands of goods
which are directly consumed (x1i ; c
1
i ) and those which are produced (or used as in-
puts) at home (x2i ; c
2
i ). In other words, it represents the quantity of goods purchased
by spouse i with her share of nonwife income in the second stage of the decision
process described above. In any case, however, the utility function ui; which is (par-
tially) identied from observed behavior, continues to represent a valid indicator of
spouse is welfare. In addition, the testability results presented in Proposition 3 and
4 are still valid in the domestic production interpretation.
3 Parametric Specication of the Model
3.1 Quadratic Conditional Labor Supply
In order to estimate and test the collective model previously developed we must rst
specify a functional form for the wifes s-conditional labor supply. Let us consider a
very general, quadratic functional form:
hf = a00(z) + a01wf + a02 + a03x+ a11wf
2 + a22 
2 + a33x
2 (15)
+a12wf + a13wfx+ a23 x;
where a01; :::; a23 are parameters and a00 is a function of observed and unobserved
heterogeneity. To make things simple, we suppose that a00 has a linear form: a00 =
0z; where  is a vector of parameters and z a vector of socio-demographic factors.
This specication has the main advantage of allowing very exible responses of
hours to wage rate. To justify this exibility, Figure 1 reports four locally weighted
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regressions of female hours on the wage rate. The thick regression line relates to
a sample of households with nonwife income below the rst quartile. The dotted
regression line relates to a sample of households with nonwife income above the rst
quartile and below the median. The dashed regression line relates to a sample of
households with nonwife income above the median and below the third quartile and
the large dashed regression line to a sample of households with nonwife income above
the third quartile. A clear non-monotonic relationship between hours and wages
appears. Moreover, for a given wage rate, the slope of this relationship depends on
nonwife income. The di¤erent curves also show a substantial income e¤ect. Hence
a exible specication is necessary to grasp these features.11
The collective model yields a set of parametric restrictions on (15) that can be
empirically tested. Using the results given in Proposition 3, we can show that the
coe¢ cients of this functional form have to satisfy the following restrictions:12
2a33a12   a13a23 = a23a23   4a33a22 = 0: (16)
Note that these restrictions do not entail unrealistic constraints on behavior. More-
over, the Slutsky condition implies that
a01   a03a13
2a33

+ 2

a11   a
2
13
4a33

wf  

a02   a03a23
2a33

hf > 0: (17)
In principle, this restriction can be globally imposed but it reduces excessively the
exibility of the functional form. Hence we prefer checking (17) for each observation.
Now, if these restrictions are imposed, the wifes Marshallian labor supply and
the sharing rule can be retrieved. And, from the results given in Proposition 4, the
superiority of goods x and c can be tested.
11These results are only illustrative since no allowance is made for the endogeneity of the wage
or nonwife income. Note that the data are sparse for wf greater than 20.
12These restrictions have been obtained using a mathematical computation software.
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Figure 1: Locally weighted regression, FHBS 2000 data
3.2 Recovering the Structural Parameters
Sharing rule. Let us dene  = a03 + a23 + a13wf + 2a33x and  = a03a23  
2a02a33. The s-conditional sharing rule is quadratic and its derivatives are given by
@
@wf
= a13


;
@
@ 
= a23


and
@
@x
= 2a33


.
Solving this system of three partial di¤erential equations, we obtain the s-conditional
sharing rule equation:
 = K0(z) +K1wf +K2 +K3x+K4wf
2 +K5 
2 +K6x
2 (18)
+K7wf +K8wfx+K9 x;
where K0(z) is an unidentied function of z, and where
K1 =
a03a13

; K2 =
a03a23

; K3 =
2a03a33

; K4 =
a213
2
;
K5 =
a223
2
; K6 =
2a233

; K7 =
2a12a33

; K8 =
2a13a33

;
K9 =
2a23a33

:
It is also possible to recover the Marshallian labor supply associated with this setting.
Marshallian labor supply. The Marshallian labor supply does not depend on
the conditioning good x and takes the following form:
hf = A(z) +Bwf + Cw
2
f +D (   ) ; (19)
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where
A(z) = a00(z) +

a02   a03a23
2a33

K0(z); B = a01   a03a13
2a33
;
C = a11   a
2
13
4a33
; D = a02   a03a23
2a33
:
Hence the wifes Marshallian labor supply belongs to the family of semi-quadratic
specications, and the normality of leisure implies that D < 0. Note that the utility
function that rationalizes this functional form exists in closed form and is given by
Stern (1986).
Slopes of the Engel curves. If goods x and c are superior, the slope of the
Engel curves generates a strong test of collective rationality, as is explained in the
discussion of Proposition 4. To carry out this test, these slopes have to be computed
for the present functional form with the identication results given in Proposition
2. However, the formulae are quite complicated, so that the slopes are not exhibited
here. Note that the positivity must be checked for each observation since the Engel
curves are not linear.
4 Data and Empirical Results
4.1 Data
The data are taken from the French Household Budget Survey 2000 conducted by
the French institute of economic and statistical information (INSEE). It contains
detailed information on consumption, labor income, working hours, education and
demographic characteristics. We select a sample of married and cohabiting couples
where the adults are aged between 20 and 60 and available for the labor market. For
this purpose, households where adults are disabled, retired or students are excluded.
We also exclude households where adults are self-employed or farmers. The labor
supply behavior of these two categories may indeed be rather di¤erent from salaried
workers and, altogether, would require a di¤erent modeling strategy. We further
select households where hours of work are positive for wives and at least 35 hours
per week for husbands. We also restrict our sample to households with no pre-
school (under 3) children in order to minimize the extent of nonseparable public
goods within the household which is not accounted for in our model. Finally, since
Browning and Chiappori (1998) argue that the hypothesis of e¢ ciency in the intra-
household decision process is more likely to be satised in stable couples, we further
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restrict our sample to households with at least two years of conjugal life. In all,
these selection criteria lead us to 1670 observations.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Mean Median Std. Dev.
The Whole Sample of Working Couples
Male weekly hours of work 40:65 39:00 8:09
Female weekly hours of work 33:24 35:00 9:56
Our Selected Sample of 1670 Couples
Female weekly hours of work 33:33 35:00 9:64
Female hourly wage rate 8:78 7:71 4:18
Annual food expenditures 6101 5762 2810
Annual nonwife income 20632 16815 19479
Wifes age 41:00 41:00 8:15
Number of children 1:28 1:00 1:08
Notes: all monetary amounts in euros.
The theory developed above requires the conditioning good x to be private and
nondurable. In addition, since expenditures on nondurables are recorded in the sur-
vey on diaries covering two-week periods (and extrapolated for the year), infrequency
of purchases may be a serious issue. We thus choose the household expenditure on
food at home (including alcohol and tobacco) as the conditioning good. One advan-
tage of using that variable is that the number of zeros is far lower than for other
goods. However, we have also estimated the model with two other conditioning
goods, namely, food away from home and clothing. In this case, the collective re-
strictions (16) and (17) are not rejected by the data but the coe¢ cients are less
precisely estimated than with food at home as the conditioning good. These esti-
mations are summarized in Table 6 (Appendix B).
The female labor supply hf is the number of working hours per week. The wage
rate wf is the average hourly earnings dened by dividing the wifes total labor
income on all jobs over annual hours of work on all jobs. As the latter information
is not included in the data, it is computed from hf and the number of months worked
during the year.
The nonlabor income y is dened as the nonlabor income net of savings and
is given by the budget identity: y = c + x   wmh   wfhf , so that the nonwife
income  is equal to:  = c + x   wfhf . That is, the nonwife income  is the
di¤erence between annual household total consumption and female labor earnings.
In doing that we follow Blundell and Walker (1986) and adjust nonwife income to
be consistent with an intertemporally separable life-cycle model.
Finally, the socio-demographic factors z include the number of children and the
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wifes age.13 As in Bourguignon and Magnac (1990), the wifes education level is
used as an excluded instrument, instead of being used as a regressor.
Some descriptive statistics of the sample are exhibited in Table 1. The rst and
second rows of the table help us compare the distribution of male and female labor
supply for working couples. On average, men work more than women and their
labor supply is more concentrated. The comparison with the United-States, for
instance, is striking. In the PSID of 1990, using a similar selection as done here for
couples, we nd that there is no obvious concentration in the distribution of hours,
apart from the mode between 35 and 40 weekly hours. This spike itself concerns
only 39:5% (resp. 36:8%) of US men (resp. women) in working couples compared
to 65:5% (resp. 45:9%) of the French men (resp. women) in working couples. We
are inclined to believe that the variability in husbandsworking hours can simply
be disregarded by a study of French wivesbehavior. This issue is examined below
with a formal test of the rigidity of male labor supply.
4.2 Endogeneity and Choice of Instruments
The wage rate is computed as labor income divided by hours of work. This may
induce the so-called division bias. Moreover, the nonwife income and the food
expenditures are likely to be endogenous as they are choice variables in the model.
Therefore, we have chosen to instrument the wifes wage rate, the nonwife income,
the food expenditures and their squares and cross-products. The possible endo-
geneity of children deserves further attention. On the one hand, we may assume
that we only need to worry about the endogeneity of recently born children and can
treat older children as predetermined. On the other hand, there is some evidence
that labor force behavior surrounding the rst birth is a signicant determinant of
lifetime work experience (Browning, 1992). All things considered, this issue is an
empirical one. Hence, since the exogeneity of the number of children is not rejected
by our data, the estimations of the model we present below do not instrument the
number of children.14
Now, an issue that requires some discussion relates to the choice of the instru-
ments. We rst assume that the husbands annual labor earnings are not correlated
with the wifes taste for work. This is a reasonable assumption as, in our model,
his labor supply is exogenously constrained. To grasp as much variation as possible
13In principle, the socio-demographic factors z may also include variables related to the husband.
However, these turn out to be insignicant.
14However, our conclusions are still valid when the number of children is supposed to be endoge-
nous. In that case the estimates di¤er only in that the coe¢ cient of the number of children in (15)
is no longer signicant. These results are available upon request.
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in the endogenous regressors, we use a fourth order polynomial in the husbands
labor earnings. We also use a second order polynomial in age and education for the
wife and for the husband, and a second order polynomial in exceptional incomes
(including inheritance, bequests and gifts) as instruments. This yealds sixteen in-
struments.15
Other instruments include a constant, the number of children, two dummies for
husbands fathers profession, a dummy variable for living in the Paris region, a
cross-term of wifes education and husbands labor earnings. Since our estimation
technique takes account of the selection of the sample, we also use the inverse Mills
ratio as an instrument. In all, we have twenty-three instruments. As usual, mea-
surement error in the instruments is not supposed to be correlated with the response
error for the endogenous variables.16
4.3 Results
Before we present any further results we report the tests of the validity of the
instruments.
4.3.1 The validity of the instruments
We rst test the null hypothesis that none of the excluded instruments is correlated
with the endogenous variables in the system of equations Y = W  + e; where
Y is the matrix of endogenous regressors, W the matrix of instruments and   a
matrix of parameters and e a matrix of random terms. The rst panel of Table 7
in Appendix C shows F statistic, corresponding p-value and adjusted R-square for
each of the nine auxiliary regressions. The p-values are close to zero, indicating
that the null hypothesis is clearly rejected. This gives evidence that the instruments
are signicant for all the endogenous variables. Note, however, that the F statistic
concerning the auxiliary regression on  2 is relatively small (less than 5). In a 2SLS
context Staiger and Stock (1997) suggest that estimates and condence interval may
be unreliable with rst-stage Fs this small.17 On the other hand, Bound, Jaeger and
Baker (1995) mention that results should be interpreted with caution for rst-stage
F statistics close to one.
15These instruments are strongly correlated. To avoid this problem, we replace the polynomi-
als with their corresponding principal components, that is orthogonal linear combinations of the
original instruments. Estimations are then more stable.
16For Altonji (1986) and Altonji and Siow (1987) this assumption is reasonable, given that these
variables are based on independent questions.
17We allow for heteroscedasticity of unknown form and estimate the model with GMM. We do
not know whether these di¤erences signicantly a¤ect their asymptotic or not.
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To decide on the potential weakness of our instruments, we test whether the
excluded instruments have enough explanatory power jointly for all the endogenous
variables. For that purpose we use the test provided in Robin and Smith (2000).
This test evaluates the rank of the coe¢ cient matrix on the excluded instruments
in the auxiliary regressions. A short account is in Blundell, Duncan and Meghir
(1998). Let ^ be a consistent and asymptotically normal estimator of a p  k
reduced form parameter matrix  on the excluded instruments.18 Here we have four
included instruments (a constant, the wifes age, the number of children and the
inverse of Mills ratio) so that there are p = 23  4 = 19 excluded instruments and
k = 9 endogenous variables. If  is not full rank (i.e., rk() < 9); the excluded
instruments are weak for at least one endogenous variable. If  is full rank (i.e.,
rk() = 9), the excluded instruments have enough explanatory power jointly for all
the endogenous variables. The Robin-Smith test of rank is based on the eigen values
of ^T ^.
Following the sequential procedure advocated in Robin and Smith (2000), we
test for H0 : rk() = r against H1 : rk() > r for r = 1; :::; 9 and halt at the rst
value of r for which the test statistic indicates a nonrejection of H0. The second
panel of Table 7 in Appendix C exposes the results. Again, the p-values are close to
zero: The null hypothesis rk() = 1 is rejected, so is the null rk() = 2; and so on
until rk() = 8 is also rejected: the reduced form coe¢ cient matrix  is full rank.
We thus conclude that the excluded instruments are valid enough to give reliable
estimates and condence interval.
4.3.2 Tests of husbands labor supply rigidity
Our theoretical results crucially rely on the postulate that the wifes labor supply
is independent of the husbands wage rate (conditionally on the levels of nonwife
income and one reference good). This is a consequence of the husbands labor supply
rigidity. In particular, if the husbands hours of work vary, the wifes labor supply
will in general depend on the husbands wage rate. In that case our conclusions will
be invalidated.
As a matter of fact, the data indicates that the dispersion of the husbands
working hours is quite limited. In spite of that the husbands wage rate can possibly
inuence the wifes behavior and question the validity of our approach. Also, the
rigidity of the husbands behavior must be tested. To do that, we introduce an
additional term, wm, in (15) and assess its signicance.19 We perform this test
18The matrix  contains only the parameters of   related to the excluded instruments in the
s-conditional labor supply equation.
19In focusing on the role of the husbands wage rate in the s-conditional labor supply, this test is
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whether Wm is included or not in the set of instruments, where Wm is the matrix of
variables constructed from the husbands labor income. In both cases the husbands
wage rate has no impact statistically di¤erent from 0.
We also test in the estimation of (15) for the endogeneity of the subset of in-
struments Wm. Suppose that the husbands wage rate is exogenous. Now it is
orthogonal to the error term if husbands labor supply is exogenously constrained.
Otherwise it is not. The corresponding test statistic is simply the di¤erence in the
criterion functions for GMM estimation with and without the questionable instru-
ments Wm (Ruud, 2000, p. 576). Under the null hypothesis of orthogonality it
converges in distribution to a 2(k) random variable, where k = 5 is the number of
questionable instruments. The di¤erence gives a test statistic of 8:139 (8:115 if the
collective restrictions (16) are imposed). At conventional levels we do not reject the
null hypothesis.20 In conclusion, even if the husbands working hours exhibit some
dispersion, this should not prevent us from applying the present theory. In addi-
tion this test reinforces the evidence that the husbands labor supply is exogenously
determined in France.
4.3.3 Labor supply estimates
Firstly, conditioning the sample on stable households with working wives and
no children under 3 year of age may induce a selectivity bias. To account for all
these selection rules we estimate a reduced-form participation equation and include
the inverse Mills ratio into the labor supply equation (15). The estimates of the
selection equation are shown in Table 8 (Appendix C). This equation includes the
wifes age and education, the husbands income and male and female unemployment
rates as explanatory variables. The results show a strong e¤ect of age, education
and income, whereas the unemployment rates have a signicant e¤ect. Hence the
labor supply equation, which excludes the latter variables, is well identied.
Let us now turn to the labor supply results. We denote the inverse Mills ratio
estimated from the participation equations by ^ and the matrix of residuals obtained
from the regression of the variables on the instruments (i.e., Y = W  + e) by be.
The rst and third columns of Table 2 provide estimates of the unrestricted and
restricted models obtained by applying OLS (NLS) on the following relation:
hf = g(wf ;  ; x; z; a) + ^b + e^be + v; (20)
where g() is the functional form (15) of the wifes labor supply, v is a random term
explicitly intended to test the implication of the dispersion in husbands working hours that may
invalidate our theory.
20Further details are available upon request.
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Table 2: Estimated Parameters of the Reduced Form Labor Supply
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
OLS GMM NLS GMM
a01 : wf 4:430
 4:727 4:190 4:501
(1:082) (1:109) (0:976) (0:989)
a02 :   10 2  0:105  0:104  0:093  0:095
(0:059) (0:059) (0:042) (0:039)
a03 : x 0:003 0:003 0:004
 0:004
(0:003) (0:003) (0:002) (0:002)
a11 : w
2
f  0:106  0:118  0:122  0:125
(0:056) (0:054) (0:044) (0:042)
a22 :  
2  10 9 4:044 4:531 3:589 4:121
(3:031) (2:782) (2:446) (2:171)
a33 : x
2  10 8 9:548 11:910 6:458 8:656
(19:687) (19:780) (5:430) (5:579)
a12 : wf  10 2 0:005 0:006 0:006 0:006
(0:005) (0:005) (0:003) (0:003)
a13 : wfx 10 2  0:032  0:033  0:026  0:029
(0:020) (0:019) (0:018) (0:017)
a23 :  x 10 9 1:374  18:600  30:450  37:800
(89:958) (92:490) (20:521) (18:600)
0 : Intercept 21:231 18:255 17:932 16:137
(9:444) (9:545) (6:946) (7:051)
ch : Number of children  1:415  1:393  1:556  1:462
(0:718) (0:705) (0:642) (0:623)
age : Wifes age  0:257  0:275  0:261  0:274
(0:089) (0:085) (0:085) (0:079)
b : Inverse Mills ratio 1:880 2:472 2:428 2:848
(2:276) (2:306) (2:039) (2:059)
bewf : bewf  3:433  3:193
(1:126) (1:021)
Objective function 9:393 9:548
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels of 10, 5 and
1% are noted *, ** and *** respectively.
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which represents the unobserved heterogeneity, and a; b and be are parameters.
The inclusion of the residuals in the labor supply equation is to control for the
endogeneity of the regressors. It also provides a direct test of exogeneity. These are
the t statistics of the estimates of be; see Smith and Blundell (1986) or Blundell,
Duncan and Meghir (1998) for a recent application. The asymptotic covariance
matrix is computed using the results of Newey (1984) and Newey and McFadden
(1994) to take into account that we are conditioning on generated regressors (i.e., ^
and e^).21 It is robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form. To save space, only the
test of exogeneity for the wifes wage rate is reported in Table 2. The wifes wage
rate is likely to be measured with error and unobserved individual characteristics
may be correlated with it. The residual of the regression of the wifes wage rate on
the instruments is denoted by e^wf . Then, under the null hypothesis, the parameter
bewf corresponding to the residual e^wf in equation (20) must be equal to zero. This
is clearly rejected by the data. The wage rate has to be instrumented.
The second and fourth columns of Table 2 are the unconstrained and constrained
models obtained by using GMM on the following equation:
hf = g(wf ;  ; x; z; a) + ^b + : (21)
The Hansens test does not reject the validity of the instruments and the overidenti-
fying restrictions. The test statistics 9:393 and 9:548 are less than the critical values
of the 20:05(10) = 18:307 and of the 
2
0:05(12) = 21:026. Note that, except for the
interaction term   x, the OLS and GMM estimations give similar results. How-
ever, under the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form, the GMM estimator
attains greater e¢ ciency (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, p. 599). Therefore, we
only refer to the GMM results in what follows.
Let us take a closer look at the results of Table 2. We note that the parameters
of the unrestricted model are not estimated with precision. Only the wifes age, the
number of children, the wage rate, its square, its interaction with food expenditures
and the nonwife income have an impact at the 5% or 10% level. This lack of
precision can be explained by the exibility of our functional form. Nonetheless,
the coe¢ cients of the restricted model (i.e., with the imposition of conditions (16))
are very similar, but exhibit smaller standard errors, so that most of them are
statistically signicant at the 5% or 10% level. In particular the wifes age and
the number of children have a signicant, negative e¤ect on the number of working
hours. Moreover, the inverse Mills ratio does not inuence wifes labor supply.
Apparently, the selection of the sample is not a serious issue.
21We account for the covariance of the coe¢ cients  ^ across the nine reduced forms. Still, we
ignore the covariance between  ^ and the estimated coe¢ cients of the participation equation.
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We now turn to the test of the collective restrictions. To begin with, we perform
a Newey-Wests test of conditions (16). Since the di¤erence in the function values
(i.e., 9:548  9:393 = 0:155) is much smaller than the critical value, 20:05(2) = 5:99,
we do not reject the restrictions at stake. However, this evidence in favor of the
collective model must be interpreted with caution. Indeed, the standard error of the
coe¢ cient a33 is large. Since this coe¢ cient enters conditions (16), the test we carry
out is not likely to be powerful. Also, the other tests at our disposal are essential to
assess the validity of the model.
Using the estimates of the restricted model, we note that the Slutsky condition
(17) is satised for a large majority (93%) of the households in the sample, and
the wifes leisure is superior.22 These results support the collective model and they
will be more closely examined below. In addition, the positivity of the slopes of
the Engel curves can be checked since it is reasonable to assume that both goods
are superior. This corresponds to a test of the second statement in Proposition 4.
Actually we observe that the slopes of the four Engel curves are positive for 95:45%
of the households in the sample. This conrms that the goods are superior and,
incidentally, valid our estimations.
On the whole, the empirical tests we describe above do not reject the collective
model concerned. Let us now consider various labor supply elasticities. These are
shown in Table 3. The elasticities of the constrained and unconstrained models are
similar and quite precisely estimated. Womens wage elasticities are positive and
statistically signicant. Income elasticities are negative and also statistically signif-
icant. The amplitude of these gures is somewhat di¤erent from that found with
French data. For example, estimating a unitary model that accounts for non-linear
taxation and nonparticipation, Blundell and Laisney (1988) report, at the sample
mean, wage and income elasticities which are equal to 2 and  0:7 respectively. Ac-
cording to the specication used, these elasticities range from 0:05 to 1 respectively
and from  0:3 to  0:2 in Bourguignon and Magnac (1990). The elasticities pre-
sented in Table 3 di¤er from previous estimations because our sample is restricted
to working wives.
The estimation of the reduced form parameters allows us to retrieve some struc-
tural components of the model. The rst panel of Table 4 reports the estimates
of the parameters of the Marshallian labor supply (19). The coe¢ cients have the
expected signs but the e¤ect of the wifes share of income is imprecisely estimated.
Note also that the wifes Marshallian labor supply is backward bending. For small
values of the wifes wage rate the substitution e¤ect dominates the income e¤ect so
22Remember that the Marshallian labor supply is linear in income. Hence the superiority of
leisure is global. See Table 4 for more details.
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Table 3: Elasticities of labor supply
Estimates Asymptotic Std. Errors p-Values
Estimated wage elasticity of the unconstrained labor supply
at wf = 5:87 (rst quartile) 0:374 0:103 0:000
at wf = 7:71 (median) 0:405 0:102 0:000
at wf = 10:33 (third quartile) 0:379 0:089 0:017
Estimated wage elasticity of the constrained labor supply
at wf = 5:87 (rst quartile) 0:386 0:086 0:000
at wf = 7:71 (median) 0:416 0:088 0:000
at wf = 10:33 (third quartile) 0:384 0:083 0:000
Estimated income elasticity of the unconstrained labor supply
at  = 9842 (rst quartile)  0:143 0:057 0:012
at  = 16815 (median)  0:217 0:084 0:009
at  = 27341 (third quartile)  0:286 0:106 0:007
Estimated income elasticity of the constrained labor supply
at  = 9842 (rst quartile)  0:136 0:049 0:006
at  = 16815 (median)  0:207 0:074 0:005
at  = 27341 (third quartile)  0:276 0:098 0:005
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are computed with the Delta method. Elasticities
are computed at hf = 39: Other covariates are at the sample mean.
Table 4: Estimated Parameters of the Structural Model: The Marshallian Labor
Supply
Parameter Asymptotic p-Values
Estimates Std Errors
B : wf 11:011 6:187 0:075
C : w2f  0:374 0:235 0:111
D : (   ) 10 2  0:011 0:013 0:368
Estimated wage elasticity of the Marshallian labor supply
at hf = 39; with wf = 5:87 (rst quartile) 0:996 0:529 0:060
at hf = 39; with wf = 7:71 (median) 1:035 0:537 0:054
at hf = 39; with wf = 10:33 (third quartile) 0:868 0:449 0:053
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are computed with the Delta method.
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Table 5: Estimated Parameters of the Structural Model: The Sharing Rule
Parameter Estimates Std. Error p-Value
K1 : wf  56923:450 84039:060 0:498
K2 :   7:317 10:105 0:469
K3 : x 33:532 41:789 0:422
K4 : w
2
f 2180:998 2933:883 0:457
K5 :  
2  10 3 0:036 0:047 0:440
K6 : x
2  10 3 0:757 0:811 0:351
K7 : wf 0:561 0:660 0:396
K8 : wfx  2:569 2:764 0:353
K9 :  x 10 2  0:033 0:038 0:382
Estimated marginal impact of wf on the sharing rulea
at wf = 5:87 (rst quartile)  35436:950 53190:582 0:505
at wf = 7:71 (median)  27415:070 42778:054 0:522
at wf = 10:33 (third quartile)  15984:050 28432:382 0:574
Estimated marginal impact of  on the sharing rulea
at  = 9842 (rst quartile)  3:699 5:690 0:516
at  = 16815 (median)  3:197 5:061 0:528
at  = 27341 (third quartile)  2:438 4:123 0:554
Estimated marginal impact of x on the sharing rulea
at x = 4136 (rst quartile) 10:415 16:930 0:538
at x = 5762 (rst quartile) 12:876 19:291 0:504
at x = 7694 (rst quartile) 15:800 22:177 0:476
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors are computed with the Delta method. a : Other
covariates are at the sample mean.
27
that an increase in the wifes wage rate has a positive impact on the working hours.
For large values of the wifes wage rate the converse is true. Then the rejection of
Slutsky positivity appears for some households in which the wife is characterized
by a very large wage rate. The second panel of Table 4 includes the wage elasticity
conditional on the sharing of nonwife income. This ignores any e¤ect the wage rate
may have on the intra-household decision process. We note that the wage elasticity
is positive, concave and statistically signicant at the 10% level. It is twice as big
as those reported in Table 3 and is close to one at the mean of the sample. It is
noteworthy that this gure may be compared with what is found in the literature
on collective models. For example, Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) report a
wage elasticity of 0:178 with United States data, Fortin and Lacroix (1997) a wage
elasticity of 0:361 with Canadian data, and Moreau and Donni (2002) a wage elas-
ticity of 0:394 with French data. The elasticities in Table 4 are substantially greater.
However, they are compatible with previous researches since the standard errors of
the estimated parameters are quite large. Finally, the sharing rule estimates are
shown in the rst panel of Table 5. The parameters turn out not to be precisely
estimated. No coe¢ cient is signicant at the 10% level. In the second panel of Table
5, the marginal impacts of the exogenous variables on the sharing rule are presented
but the estimates are still imprecise.
5 Conclusion
In the present paper we suppose that the husbands labor supply is exogenously
determined. We then advocate a simple approach to model the wifes labor supply,
in which the wifes behavior is explained by her wage rate, other household incomes,
socio-demographic variables and the demand for one good consumed at the house-
hold level. In this approach the level of the conditioning good can be interpreted as
an indicator of the distribution of power within the household.
We then demonstrate that the estimation of a single equation (including one
conditioning good as argument) permits to carry out tests of collective rationality
and to identify some elements of the structural model. The simplicity of the esti-
mation method suggests that the approach used in this paper is specially protable
to perform empirical tests.
Another important contribution of the present paper is to show that our approach
(and the collective setting as a whole for that matter) is compatible with domestic
production on the condition that the household production function belongs to some
specic family of separable technologies.
Finally, these theoretical considerations are followed by an empirical application
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using a French sample of working wives. We show that, overall, the collective re-
strictions are satised by the data. However, the estimates of the structural model
are not precisely estimated. One way of dealing with that is to exploit the infor-
mation on nonparticipating wives. Indeed, the parameters that enter the reduced
participation equation (used in constructing the inverse Mills ratio) are not related
to the parameters of the labor supply equation. In that case, the basic idea is
to estimate a structuralparticipation equation, derived from the comparison of a
shadow wage equation (incorporating the parameters of the wifes labor supply) and
a market wage equation. The implementation of this idea raises some econometric
di¢ culties, though. This is the topic of future work.
Appendix A : Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 2
1. Identication of @m=@. Di¤erentiating the s-conditional labor supply with
respect to  and x gives:
@hf
@ 
=
@f
@ (   )

1  @
@ 

;
@hf
@x
=   @f
@ (   )
@
@x
:
Since @hf=@ 6= 0 from R, this yields:
 @hf
@ 

@hf
@x
 1
=

1  @
@ 

@
@x
 1
: (22)
Similarly, using Lemma 1 and di¤erentiating the household demand for good x with
respect to  and x gives:
1 =

@m
@
  @f
@ (   )

@
@x
; (23)
@m
@
=

@m
@
  @f
@ (   )

1  @
@ 

(24)
or
@m
@
=

1  @
@ 

@
@x
 1
(25)
Substituting (22) in (25) yields the husbands Engel curve:
@m
@
=  @hf
@ 

@hf
@x
 1
= : (26)
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2. Identication of @=@wf , @=@ and @=@x. Di¤erentiating (26) with re-
spect to wf ,  and x yields:
@2m
@2
@
@wf
=
@
@wf
,
@2m
@2
@
@ 
=
@
@ 
,
@2m
@2
@
@x
=
@
@x
.
Since
@
@ 
@hf
@x
6= @
@x
@hf
@ 
;
this system of partial di¤erential equations, together with (22), can be solved with
respect to @=@wf , @=@ and @=@x. That is,
@
@wf
=
@
@wf
,
@
@ 
=
@
@ 
,
@
@x
=
@
@x
. (27)
3. Identication of @f=@(   ) and @f/@wf . If we di¤erentiate the wifes
s-conditional labor supply with respect to x and wf , we obtain:
@hf
@x
=   @f
@(   )
@
@x
;
@hf
@wf
=
@f
@wf
  @f
@(   )
@
@wf
: (28)
Since  6= 0 and @=@x 6= 0, substituting (27) in (28) yields:
@f
@(   ) =  
@hf
@x
1
 (@=@x)
;
@f
@wf
=
@hf
@wf
  @hf
@x
@=@wf
@=@x
: (29)
4. Identication of @f=@(   ) and @f=@wf . The slopes of the demand for
good x can be retrieved in a similar way. Substituting (26) and (27) in (23) gives:
@f
@ (   ) =  
1
 (@=@x)
: (30)
Di¤erentiating the household demand for good x with respect to wf , and using (26)
and (27) yield:
@f
@wf
=  @=@wf
@=@x
:
5. Identication of other elements. The derivatives of the Marshallian de-
mands for good c can be obtained from the individual budget constraints. Moreover,
once the function k(z) is picked up, the wifes total consumption can be retrieved.
Then, the wifes utility function is derived as usual. 
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Proof of Proposition 3
1. Substituting (29) in (8) yields:
@hf
@wf
  @hf
@x

@=@wf
@=@x
  hf
 (@=@x)

> 0:
2. From the Youngs Theorem, the derivatives of the sharing rule have to satisfy
a symmetry restriction. Simplifying yields:
@
@wf
@
@x
  @
@x
@
@wf
=
@
@ 
@
@x
  @
@x
@
@ 
= 0:

Proof of Proposition 4
1. From (29),
@hf=@x
 (@=@x)
> 0;
if wifes leisure is normal. This gives the rst statement in Proposition 4.
2. From (26) and (30),
 > 0,   1
 (@=@x)
> 0;
if good x is normal (for both spouses). From these expressions and the individual
budget constraints, we obtain:
1  @m
@
= 1   > 0;
1  @f
@(   )   wf
@f
@(   ) = 1  +
1 + wf (@hf=@x)
 (@=@x)
> 0:
if good c is normal (for both spouses). Rearranging these expressions gives the
second statement. 
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Appendix B : Alternative Estimations
We carry out two alternative estimations of the model, with expenditures on food
away from home and clothing as the conditioning good respectively. One problem,
however, is that reported expenditures on clothing (resp. food away from home) are
equal to zero for 7:5% (resp. 18%) of the 1670 households of our selection. Be that
as it may, these estimations are presented in Table 6. For the sake of comparability,
the estimated parameters are obtained with the same set of instruments as those
used for the regression in the main text. To complete these results, note that the
parameters B and C of the Marshallian labor supply are signicant at the 1% level
when the conditioning good is food away from home; in that case, the parameters
K6 and K9 are also signicant (at the 5% and the 10% level). Furthermore, the
Slutsky condition is satised for 92% of the sample, while conditions (a) and (b)
of Proposition 4 are satised for 100% and 34% of the sample respectively. On the
other hand, when the conditioning good is clothing, the results are less convincing.
No parameters of the structural model are signicant. The Slutsky condition is
satised for 66% of the sample, and the conditions (a) and (b) are satised for
100 % and 8% of the sample respectively.
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Table 6: Estimation with two alternative conditioning goods
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model
Food away Clothing Food away Clothing
from home from home
a01 wf 5:406
 5:104 4:169 4:018
(2:801) (1:881) (1:738) (1:021)
a02   10 2  0:059  0:054  0:068  0:043
(0:050) (0:044) (0:041) (0:032)
a03 x  0:001  0:003 0:002  0:000
(0:007) (0:006) (0:004) (0:004)
a11 w
2
f  0:207  0:222  0:142  0:139
(0:106) (0:092) (0:050) (0:040)
a22  
2  10 9 5:879 2:504 6:010 2:394
(2:969) (2:896) (2:751) (2:130)
a33 x
2  10 8 60:380 25:920 48:680 1:984
(52:380) (50:360) (41:230) (9:804)
a12 wf  10 2 0:002 0:005 0:002 0:002
(0:003) (0:004) (0:003) (0:003)
a13 wfx= 10 2 0:017 0:031  0:017  0:006
(0:050) (0:041) (0:022) (0:021)
a23  x 10 9  193:000  134:000  108:00  13:800
(132:400) (111:600) (59:570) (34:550)
0 Intercept 15:673 19:564 22:412 23:100
(14:619) (10:231) (10:146) (6:109)
chi Number of children  0:244  1:019  0:162  1:169
(0:868) (0:979) (0:766) (0:768)
age Wifes age  0:150  0:144  0:159  0:151
(0:062) (0:059) (0:051) (0:046)
b Inverse Mills ratio 3:355 1:599 1:924 0:974
(3:624) (2:239) (2:815) (1:811)
Objective function 6:391 7:4373 8:383 12:263
Notes: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Signicance levels of
10, 5 and 1% are noted *, ** and *** respectively.
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Appendix C : Auxiliary Regressions and Selection
Equation
Table 7: Tests of the Validity of the Instruments
F -stat p-Value R2
The Fishers test
1 : wf 31:538 0:000 0:386
2 :  8:644 0:000 0:157
3 : x 9:061 0:000 0:255
4 : wf 13:369 0:000 0:206
5 : wfx 23:543 0:000 0:422
6 :  x 9:974 0:000 0:238
7 : w2f 16:494 0:000 0:277
8 :  2 4:744 0:000 0:059
9 : x2 7:386 0:000 0:209
The Robin-Smiths test
H0 : rk = i; H1 : rk > i i = 1; :::; 7 0:000
H0 : rk = 8; H1 : rk = 9 0:000
In Table 8, the wifes age is represented by dummies, Agei with i = 1; :::; 6. The
age groups are < 30, 31 34, 35 39, 40 44, 45 49 and  50. The wifes education
level is also represented by dummies, Educi, with i = 1; :::; 7, which represent the
highest diploma attained by the wife. The unemployment rate is specic to gender
and varies with age and education. It is denoted by uratei, with i = m; f . The
statistics for the normality test is equal to 4:014 (with two degrees of freedom)
which is acceptable at conventional levels.
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Table 8: Reduced Form Participation Probit
Parameters estimates As. std. errors
Intercept  17:413 3:627
Age1  0:892 0:088
Age2  0:495 0:079
Age3 reference reference
Age4 0:400 0:086
Age5 0:335 0:091
Age6 0:509 0:110
Educ1  1:480 0:194
Educ2  0:865 0:197
Educ3  0:666 0:126
Educ4  0:699 0:121
Educ5  0:188 0:133
Educ6  0:339 0:109
Educ7 reference reference
ln(wmhm) 3:760 0:745
ln2(wmhm)  0:202 0:038
uratem 0:055 0:021
uratef 0:067 0:017
uratemuratef  0:003 0:001
Non-Normality (2) 4:014 p-Value= 0:134
Skewness (1) 3:129 p-Value= 0:077
Kurtosis (1) 2:564 p-Value= 0:109
Non-Participants= 1096, Participants= 1670
Note: Signicance levels of 10, 5 and 1% are noted *, ** and *** respectively. The
statistics of tests have a 2 distribution (degrees of freedom are in parentheses). The
normality test statistics reported here follow the Generalised Residual methodology
of Chesher and Irish (1987).
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